The passengers aboard Wednesday's flydubai flight narrowly escaped disaster. Yet even as the circumstances of the suspected attack were still under investigation, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's allies were already treating the incident as vindication of his warnings about an impending security threat.
Had the plane crashed, perhaps in Tel Aviv, leaving hundreds dead and wounded, who would the government and its mouthpieces have blamed? Gadi Eisenkot? Naftali Bennett? Above all, opposition leader Yair Lapid. Netanyahu had warned Lapid the previous night that an attack might be imminent. Surely, then, Lapid should have known what was coming.
That may sound far-fetched. But the political response to Wednesday's incident suggests otherwise.
Netanyahu's allies didn't hesitate to praise what they saw as proof of his foresight. They argued he had identified a potential threat only to be met with suspicion and disbelief. He had even posted a video delivering the warning, with a fighter jet in the background to really drive the message home.
Prime Minister Netanyahu at IDF Air Force Tel Nof base: "I am here at the Air Force base with our heroic pilots and our outstanding ground crews. We are operating constantly on all fronts. The day before yesterday, we eliminated the despicable terrorist who kidnapped Noa
Show moreBut their eagerness to claim credit raises a more important question: If Netanyahu had intelligence pointing to an attack, what did his government do to stop it?
If there was a credible warning, why didn't Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, the transportation minister or the heads of Israel's security agencies order tighter security checks, review procedures, suspend flights if necessary or warn the Emiratis? Netanyahu had, after all, just returned from the United Arab Emirates.
And if he knew of a specific threat, why didn't Netanyahu share that information with Lapid during their security briefing? The prime minister is legally required to keep the opposition leader informed on matters of national security.
The Prime Minister's Office responded by citing a senior political source, who said Netanyahu's military secretary had briefed Lapid on increased "hostile activity abroad." That may be true. But warnings regarding threats overseas have been routine since October 7, particularly ahead of holidays and elections. Lapid was not warned about an aircraft hijacking. Even if he had been, responsibility for acting on intelligence lies with the prime minister, not the opposition leader.
Katz, meanwhile, appeared just as eager to declare victory. Shortly after Netanyahu described the incident as a "serious security incident," the defense minister went further, calling it an attempted "jihadist terror attack."
Election campaigns can drive people to madness. But it is hard to remember another occasion on which a government so eagerly incriminated itself for what would otherwise look like a catastrophic failure.
If Katz had information indicating a planned attack, rather than an isolated act by a lone pilot, where were the Shin Bet and Mossad? And why was he so quick to determine the nature of the incident when Israel's security agencies had yet to reach a definitive conclusion?
A month ago, one might have dismissed Katz's behavior as another stunt ahead of the Likud primary. That excuse is no longer viable. His rush to conclude the facts were established raises questions that his own government would presumably prefer to avoid.
Even in the middle of an election campaign, one might have expected a little restraint after a disaster was narrowly averted thanks to the courage and resourcefulness of the passengers aboard the plane – and a considerable amount of luck.
Instead, Netanyahu and his allies appear determined to score political points from an incident that, based on the information currently available, presents two possibilities.
Either this was an intelligence and security failure that the government should have prevented. Or it was an isolated act by a pilot without a nationalist motive, in which case Netanyahu's earlier warning was irrelevant.
Neither possibility offers much reason for a victory lap.
With the October 27 election fast approaching, Netanyahu appears increasingly determined to turn security threats into political assets. On Tuesday, he warned that Israel's enemies were planning attacks ahead of the election, a claim the defense establishment rejected.
Wednesday's flydubai incident offered another opportunity to suggest that his warning had been justified. But in their rush to portray Netanyahu as the leader who saw the danger coming, he and his allies have invited a question they may find considerably harder to answer:
If he really saw it coming, why wasn't anything done to prevent it?
