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Destroyed house in Lasanod. Credit: Markus Hoehne, 2023.

This update on the ongoing conflict over Lasanod (earlier analyses of the conflict can be found here and here) provides an overview of the fighting through the past months. It also highlights some administration building efforts of SSC-Khaatumo and discusses the so far failed mediation efforts. It then provides three scenarios about the developments of the crisis in the coming months. It concludes by highlighting the challenges for a lasting political settlement of the conflict. This text is based on intensive research via phone between mid-January and early May 2023, during which more than sixty conversations were held with actors in the region (ranging from a few minutes to more than an hour) and documented in handwritten notes. Moreover, the author visited the conflict zone between 5 and 14 May 2023, staying in Lasanod (four days), Buuhoodle (one day) and Garowe (five days). In this time he had dozens of formal and informal conversations with politicians, traditional authorities, military leaders, medical personnel and youths and in Lasanod, and visited sites affected by the war. A much more detailed account on the matter can be found here.

Dynamics of war

Fighting over Lasanod is still continuing in June 2023. Over the past four months, several important battles have taken place. Without any question, 6 February was a decisive day. Fighting started around Hotel Hamdi in the east, an area just on the outskirts of Lasanod, around 6 am EAT. Somaliland soldiers accompanying emissaries of the government in Hargeysa, who had been staying in town until then, were driven out of Lasanod. Simultaneously, the Somaliland army positioned north of town, in a place called Gooja’ade were reported to be shelling the town including its civilian inhabitants. Within the first ten days of the conflict, the number of casualties in Lasanod rose to over 170 killed and around 500 injured. Tens of thousands civilians fled Lasanod, many seeking refuge with relatives in the countryside. However, in the middle of the long dry season, the resources to accommodate IDPs were scarce among the countryside dwellers. Others fled to Garowe, the capital of Puntland ca. 130 kilometres east of Lasanod. Some 60,000 residents of Lasanod also fled into Ethiopia, where a refugee camp was established near Marqan in the Somali Region of Ethiopia, supported by the UN and the Ethiopian government.

Throughout February, the Somaliland army stationed north-east of Lasanod fired indiscriminately at the town daily with grenades, artillery and rifles. Most of the casualties were fighters. But also civilians in Lasanod fell victim to the Somaliland attacks. The number of casualties on the Somaliland side was not shared with the author, though social media reported numerous times the deaths of high-ranking officers in the Somaliland army.

In the first weeks of the war, several decisive battles took place. The most important was the one against Mahad Ambashe and his forces. General Ambashe belonged to the Dhulbahante/Jama Siyad sub-clan, and he was a long-standing officer in the Somaliland army. He and his approximately 200 soldiers were stationed in north-west Lasanod. In contrast to most other Dhulbahante officers who had served in the Somaliland army until recently, Mahad Ambashe did not join his people’s uprising in January and not even when the bombardment started on 6 February 2023. However, General Ambashe’s forces also did not enter the war on the Somaliland side. Still, their presence in Lasanod was considered a major threat by those defending Lasanod against Somaliland’s attack. On 24 February, the Dhulbahante traditional leaders warned Mahad Ambashe either to join the defenders of Lasanod or leave the town. He did neither, and thus a fierce battle took place on 25 February between 9 and 11 am EAT in which close patrilineal relatives fought each other. Eventually, Mahad Ambashe fled with a small number of followers, leaving behind considerable equipment and even two tanks, at least one of which was fully functioning. On this day alone, 302 fighters were wounded and 51 killed according to Lasanod hospital’s records which were shared with the author (these numbers included fighters on both sides, who all were Dhulbahante). The eviction of Mahad Ambashe and his troops from Lasanod was a serious blow for Somaliland. In reaction, the Somaliland army was withdrawn from all its positions in eastern Sool, most significantly from around Tukaraq, some 70 kilometres east of Lasanod. Somaliland’s forces had captured the place from the Puntland army in early 2018, shortly after President Muse Bihi (2017-) had come to power, as part of a serious attempt to expand east. After 25 February 2023, all Somaliland troops stationed in eastern Sool region were sent to Gooja’ade as reinforcements. Thus, by winning the battle against Mahad Ambashe and his forces, the fighters defending Lasanod had not only secured their town from within, but also freed, in their view, much of Sool.

Until the end of February, the fighting was between Dhulbahante and the Somaliland army. Among the Dhulbahante fighters were professional soldiers who had defected from the Somaliland army, while others had taken leave from the Puntland army or from the Somali National Army in southern Somalia. However, the vast majority were those who had defected from Somaliland, plus many volunteers, who were ordinary inhabitants of Lasanod and the surrounding countryside who had taken up arms to defend their clan homeland (Somali deegaan). It was only after the forces of Mahad Ambashe had been evicted from Lasanod and the city was free of any Somaliland army that larger armed units belonging to various Harti clans and sub-clans started to arrive around Lasanod. Harti is a clan coalition including fighters from the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, Majeerteen and other clans. The arrival of the various units from other Harti groups changed the dynamics of the conflict.

On 28 February, heavy fighting took place to the north-west of Lasanod, near a place called Dhuyu’ Hunsho that was held by Harti forces, including units commanded by Abdi Madoobe. Simultaneously, the Somaliland army resorted to heavy shelling of Lasanod. As usual, fighting including shelling started early, around 6 am EAT. Around 8:30 am EAT, a building belonging to the General Hospital that hosted the hospital’s blood bank was hit by artillery and extensively damaged.

From early March 2023 onward, the conflict was between Harti fighters, of whom the majority were still Dhulbahante, and the Somaliland army, which also included soldiers from non-Isaaq clans, e.g. from Ise and Gadabursi in the far west of Somaliland, but hardly any Dhulbahante or Warsangeli soldiers anymore. While it is difficult to establish how many fighters have been positioned on each side since March 2023, my rough estimate is that some 7-8000 Harti fighters, some 80 percent of whom are Dhulbahante, are engaged in defending Lasanod. Somaliland, on the other hand, had amassed some 6-8000 soldiers around Lasanod between Maraga (east), Gooja’ade (north) and near Hargaga (northwest), plus maybe 1-2000 armed policemen.

Armed presence on the streets of Lasanod. Credit: Markus Hoehne, 2023.

In the first two weeks of March, no serious military engagements took place around Lasanod, except some sporadic exchange of fire across the front lines, mostly towards the north-east. Somaliland troops at Gooja’ade sometimes launched grenades or artillery at eastern Lasanod. Some houses were damaged. On 18, 26 and 31 March, heavy fighting took place again. More than 500 fighters were injured and over 60 killed in those battles on the side of Dhulbahante alone, according to Lasanod hospital records. This does not include casualties from other Harti clans and the Somaliland forces. The fighting did not lead to any change of strategic positions. During the first weeks of April, the situation around Lasanod remained relatively calm. Both sides prepared for more fighting. On 25 April violence erupted again when Somaliland forces attacked Harti positions at Dhuyu’ Hunsho, north-west of Lasanod. It soon spread from there to the north-east and east and Lasanod was shelled, some shells landing near the General Hospital.

Over the coming three and a half weeks, the fighting stalled, though no official stalemate had been reached. Sporadic exchanges of fire took place across the frontlines in the east and north-east. Mid-May, a new frontline was opened some forty kilometres north-west of Lasanod, near a place called Tuulo Samakaab. Harti forces advanced from a place called Dhaban Saar, some twenty kilometres south of Tuulo Samakaab. The latter is a village on the tarmac road between Lasanod and Yagoori and is strategically relevant, since the supply line of the Somaliland forces north of Lasanod runs through it. The Harti forces set out to cut this supply line. On 16 and 18 May, heavy fighting happened around Tuulo Samakaab and also east of Lasanod. Lasanod hospitals counted around 400 injured and almost 60 dead fighters. The Somaliland army also suffered heavy casualties. Until early June, no more heavy engagements between the two sides have taken place.

Over the past months, Muse Bihi, his government and many Somalilanders active on social media have been accusing various external actors of being behind the uprising and the war in Lasanod. They argued that ‘Al Shabaab’, the ‘Puntland Army’ or even the ‘Somali National Army’ (SNA) were behind the fighting against the Somaliland army. It remained unclear, however, why Al Shabaab, the Puntland army and the SNA should be fighting on the same side while the SNA was simultaneously rolling back Al Shabaab in central Somalia, and Puntland has been defending itself in bloody clashes against Al Shabaab intrusions for many years since 2008.

An administration in the making

 Since mid-January 2023, a civilian administration has been in the making in Lasanod, consisting of guddiga isimada (the council of the highest-ranking traditional authorities), guddiga 33ka (the council of 33 elected men from various Dhulbahante branches, plus Fiqishiini – the Fiqishiini being originally Hawiye but having resided very close to Dhulbahante around the village Adhi’adeeye, west of Lasanod, for the past centuries) and guddiga degaanka (the council of the area, which consists of the mayor, the vice-mayor and others working for them). The highest traditional authorities of the Dhulbahante and Fiqishiini meet on a daily basis to discuss the directions of the movement. They are concerned mainly with positioning SSC-Khaatumo within Somalia’s federal political framework, which is included in the provisions of the (transitional) constitution of the country in force since 2012. Based on the latter, six federal states (Jubbaland, South West State, Hiirshabelle, Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland) plus the capital-region Benadir are part of the federal structure of Somalia. Somaliland, of course, refuses to be included and sees itself rather as an independent state, albeit lacking international recognition. The Dhulbahante aspire at the moment to establishing their own federal state, although it is unclear if they will succeed. Moreover, the isimo also are in charge of discussing a ceasefire and options for peace talks with emissaries from Somaliland, southern Somalia or Ethiopia and representatives of the international community including the USA and the EU. The highest-ranking Dhulbahante leaders are also discussing the political dynamics of the SSC-Khaatumo movement with isimo from allied clans, and also with politicians in Puntland in north-eastern Somalia. Setting up their own federal state would have implications for Puntland, which has so far included the Dhulbahante areas. Leaders in Puntland emphasize that they support whatever the will of the Dhulbahante is, since basically they all agree on the aim of re-establishing a united Somalia. Recently, at the end of May, a delegation of Dhulbahante traditional leaders went to Mogadishu to discuss political issues there. Finally, the isimo are in direct communication with the leading military commanders of the Harti forces and, together with the council of military commanders, take the strategic decisions.

The council of 33[1] is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the SSC-Khaatumo movement. Its main tasks are securing the finances of the forces and running the hospitals and other critical infrastructure, like electricity. The council is structured into sub-committees, e.g., for financial affairs or health matters. Its members are in contact with Dhulbahante and Fiqishiini business-people and diaspora communities inside and outside the area to obtain funding. The mayor and his team are in charge of security in Lasanod. During the first weeks of the war, when most inhabitants had left Lasanod, the situation in town was partly chaotic. There was a shortage of water, since the Somaliland army had cut the water supply coming from the water plant north of town, near Gooja’ade. Also food was partly short too. Alcohol was smuggled into town from Ethiopia. In early May, the mayor set up a police force and provided it with legal training to control the town and curb problems resulting from the ‘state of exception’ in which many of the fighters and a few others in town existed since early February 2023.

Besides the above described civilian administration in the making, a joint military command of the Harti forces defending Lasanod was established. It included senior officers from all the clan units involved. The overall commander is Said Shoodhe, a senior Dhulbahante officer who, before the war, served as vice-commander of the Puntland army. His vice-commander is a Majeerteen officer. The main task of the military command is to integrate the various forces, some of which are well trained, while others are ‘nomadic fighters’ or inhabitants of Lasanod who recently took up a gun. But the coordination between the trained units from different clans is not always easy.

Failed mediation efforts

In mid-February, a delegation of Isaaq high-ranking elders (Somali saladiin) travelled to Yogoori, some sixty kilometres north-west of Lasanod, where they hoped to arrange a meeting with their counterparts from the Dhulbahante clan. One problem was that the mandate of the Isaaq traditional leaders was not absolutely clear. The Dhulbahante isimo stated that, before peace talks could start, Muse Bihi would have to withdraw his forces from around Lasanod. Initially, the idea was that a withdrawal of at least thirty kilometres to the north-west, maybe to Adhi’adeeye, would be a sign of Muse Bihi’s goodwill in wanting to initiate peace talks. However, it then became clear that the majority of Dhulbahante, and particularly those residing north-west of Lasanod, would only accept a withdrawal of the Somaliland forces to Oog, which would mean their vacating all Dhulbahante lands. However, the Isaaq saladiin had no mandate to order the withdrawal of the Somaliland army, which was a matter for President Muse Bihi. The elders simply had a mandate to start talks. While the traditional leaders of the two sides did not meet in person, since coming to Lasanod was too dangerous for the Isaaq saladiin, and meeting somewhere else was not an option for the Dhulbahante leaders as long as fighting over Lasanod was ongoing, they had several phone and Zoom conversations, as I heard from one Habar Je’lo Suldan involved in the mediation effort. The problem was, according to the Isaaq side, that to withdraw the Somaliland army from Lasanod before peace talks could start would mean that the army had been defeated without a fight and that, even if the peace talks should fail, the Somaliland army could hardly return to the strategically important positions it had vacated. During the time when the Isaaq saladiin were staying in Yagoori and then Ainabo, hoping that some way could be found to deescalate the conflict, the heavy battles mentioned above happened at the end of February. This made the attempts to settle the conflict by ‘traditional means’ futile.

However, another problem became visible with regard to this (failed) mediation effort. Politics among the Dhulbahante, in the SSC region, was largely based on a traditional system in which power was shared between various sub-clans and lineages proportionally, based on consensus. Each group was represented by a traditional leader, who together formed the council of isimo. This meant, on the one hand, that the leaders could only take decisions that indeed reflected the will of the majority of Dhulbahante. On the other hand, it also meant that the isimo were the ‘government’ of the clan. The Isaaq saladiin, in contrast, were not the government of their people. Their people, the Isaaq, were governed by the government of Somaliland in Hargeysa, headed by Muse Bihi (2017-).

Police station in Lasanod. Credit: Markus Hoehne, 2023.

Thus, the attempts to mediate between the two sides were bound to fail not only because the demands of the Dhulbahante would mean the defeat of the Somaliland army without a fight, but also because in this affair two different political systems were clashing, one being inspired by European traditions of centralised statehood, with a president on top who only accepted other presidents as negotiation partners,[2] the other based on Somali traditions of (sub-)clan representation and consensus building with the isimo as the highest power, at the same level, in their view, as presidents. This shows also that the ‘hybrid political order’ combining European and Somali traditions of politics, which existed in Somaliland in the past, particularly in the 1990s, has become so unbalanced in the last decade with the European-style institutions (presidents, ministers, party leaders) dominating over any traditional institutions (gurti, [sub-]clan elders), that in reality, there is hardly any hybrid order at work anymore in Somaliland – at least not at the level of national politics.

The international community took notice of the conflict escalating in and around Lasanod somewhat later, only when the fighting started on 6 February 2023. Then, however, the EU, the UN, the USA and others started discussing the matter within days. Over the second half of February, I had online conversations with EU and US diplomats and with World Bank staff concerned with the causes of the conflict and its further implications. It became clear that these members of the international community did not believe rumours spread by the Somaliland government, but also by some US-based so called IR-experts, that Al Shabaab was involved or that the crisis in Lasanod was being steered by outside actors, whether Somalia’s ex-President Farmajo or China. Still, some of the mentioned international actors held on to the idea (at least throughout February) that the government of Somaliland was not only a party to the conflict, but ultimately was in charge of coming up with an overall settlement. This, however, was out of tune with the perspective of the Dhulbahante isimo, who, once the war had started, quickly established themselves as the clan’s foreign and other policy leaders. They accordingly saw themselves to be on an equal footing with the Somaliland government and announced that their aim was to establish a separate administration called SSC-Khaatumo. As Somali unionists, they only accepted the suzerainty of the government in Mogadishu, albeit the current Somali president so far has not yet shown enthusiasm to seize this opportunity to thwart the prospects of Somaliland to finally separate from Somalia.

The instability caused by the Dhulbahante uprising in the SSC regions was a concern for the World Bank and other development agencies, who, over the past decade or so, had become used to implementing ever larger projects in Somaliland, which of course, technically speaking and regarding the planned volume, included the SSC regions, even though very little of the development aid earmarked for Somaliland as a whole ever reached the Dhulbahante- and Warsangeli-inhabited regions, which had persistently been labelled ‘unsettled’ by the government in Hargeysa over much of the past three decades.

Another mediation initiative had been undertaken by the Ethiopian government in early March. A delegation of military officers met with the Dhulbahante isimo in Garowe and afterwards met with Muse Bihi and his government in Hargeysa. Yet, it remained unclear what had been agreed among the mediators and their Somali counterparts. A planned follow-up meeting in Addis Ababa later in March did not happen. Both sides, the Dhulbahante leaders and the government in Hargeysa, accused each other of having spoiled the effort. Thus in contrast to the situations in 2007, when Somaliland took over Lasanod, and in early 2018, when Muse Bihi advanced beyond Tukaraq, close to Garowe, neither Ethiopia nor other members of the international community have been able to end the crisis over Lasanod thus far. Notably, during the periods of external mediation, especially the efforts of the Ethiopian delegation and the delegation of elders from southern Somalia, the fighting over Lasanod has halted for the most part. Both sides obviously respected the attempts to mediate. They most likely also used the suspension of hostilities as a time to treat their wounded, reinforce their troops and acquire more weapons and ammunition.

Forecast

Scenario 1: Wait and see

Both sides in the conflict over Lasanod face each other on very similar military footings. While Somaliland probably has a slight advantage when it comes to the number of vehicles, artillery pieces and tanks, the Harti forces are now also well-equipped and probably have more men under arms, albeit not all well-trained. Both sides have claimed over the past three months that they would make decisive progress in capturing Lasanod or in driving the Somaliland army out of its positions. This did not happen. Both sides have suffered considerable losses. One possible scenario for the coming month could be that no massive fighting happens and a ‘wait-and-see’ approach is adopted. This, however, will most likely be of advantage to Somaliland, since it has a more stable economic basis than the Harti force. The latter is financed through donations by members of the Harti diaspora and business-people in the region. The Somaliland army, on the other hand, has a fixed budget based on state revenue produced largely through import-export taxes in Berbera and along the Berbera corridor. Many of the forces positioned around Lasanod today were there already before the war broke out, meaning: their expenses are included in the national budget on a yearly basis. It is likely that the Somaliland army can stay in its positions north-east and north of Lasanod for a long time without fighting, while the Harti forces are likely to fall apart if no decisive advance is made in the coming weeks. And that means that it is unlikely that the Dhulbahante leadership will accept such a standstill.

Scenario 2: More serious fighting

The Harti forces defending Lasanod have only been established recently. They are in need of maintenance, training and integration as an army. There is a risk that they may fall apart if they lose sight of their goal of freeing Lasanod from Somaliland occupation. Besides, within Lasanod as well, the situation of ‘no war, no peace’ cannot be accepted forever. The vast majority of the town’s residents are still IDPs in the countryside, in Garowe or in refugee camps in Ethiopia. These people need to return, the town’s economy must be restarted, and children and students have to go to school and university again, otherwise Lasanod is at risk of becoming a ‘ghost town’. The Dhulabahante leaders have exposed themselves with their decision to go to war. They received immense moral support from Somalis all over Somalia and abroad for their unionist stance. Now, they still have to exploit the momentum thus created. For all these reasons, it is very likely that the Harti forces will go on the offensive very soon. This was indicated already in the second half of May by the attempts to capture Tuulo Samakaab along the tarmac road between Bur’o and Lasanod, a strategic point for cutting the Somaliland army positioned north of Lasanod off from any reinforcements. If all-out war happens between these two sides, the number of casualties will be massive, since both sides will mainly use infantry and technicals (pickup-trucks with machine guns mounted on the back).

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Hotel in Lasanod affected by the fighting. Credit: Markus Hoehne, 2023.

Scenario 3: Mediation and ceasefire

All mediation efforts so far have failed. The reason is indeed that the basic positions of both sides – the Dhulbahante and the Somaliland government – cannot be harmonized. The vast majority of all Dhulbahante wants the government in Hargeysa to withdraw its forces from around Lasanod and vacate the Dhulbahante territories. This being achieved as part of ceasefire negotiations essentially would mean defeating the Somaliland army without a fight. On the other hand, the Somaliland government agrees to negotiations only under the presumption that eventually the Dhulbahante will agree to remain part of Somaliland. This is unacceptable to most clan members, given the violence unleashed against Lasanod and its residents by Muse Bihi’s government. Thus, there seems to be hardly anything to mediate at the moment. A ceasefire is unlikely as long as the Somaliland army is occupying Dhulbahante territory.

Yet, one possibility, albeit one which would require major diplomatic efforts, to achieve lasting peace in the region through negotiations would be that the federal government in Mogadishu, backed by its international allies, would take a strong stand on the matter. It would have to work on a solution that supports the Dhulbahante aspirations to become part of Somalia and simultaneously respects the political and economic achievements in central (and western) Somaliland. Such a solution could be based on the idea of a transitional phase in which Somaliland except the Dhulbahante- and Warsangeli-inhabited territories exists in a confederation with Somalia before the final status of the political relationship of both political entities is decided. The lands inhabited by Harti to the east and Isaaq to the west would have to be separated, starting from west of Buuhoodle (in Togadheer region) to west of Gumays (in Sool region) to east of Erigabo (in Sanaag region). Nomads in those areas would know which land belongs to which group. International actors would have to guarantee the transparent and peaceful implementation of any measures necessary for such a solution.

Conclusion

On 7 June, the UN Security Council published a statement on Somalia in which it asked Somaliland to withdraw its army from Lasanod. This happened while several Dhulbahante leaders were still in Mogadishu, having consultations with members of the government there and also reaching out to the wider civil society. It is not yet clear if this will be a ‘game changer’. However, it seems clear that the government of Muse Bihi and its supporters manoeuvred Somaliland into a very difficult political position. The hard hand used by Somaliland security forces against protestors and dissenters in Lasanod from the end of December 2022 has been serving to unite the Dhulbahante. The bombardments and attacks against the town from February onward fused this clan unity and even forged very strong solidarity among the larger Harti clan-coalition. Besides, most Somalis across Somalia and in the diaspora support the uprising in Lasanod, which concerns much more than the question of who controls Lasanod. It essentially is about Somali unity versus the secession of Somaliland in the borders of the former British Protectorate. The latter has been rejected by most Somalis, and it also has not received any international recognition over the past 32 years.

While certainly both sides – the Dhulbahante and their leaders as well as the current government of Somaliland and its supporters – were involved in the escalation of the conflict, it seems now that any compromise will demand more from Somaliland than from Dhulbahante. The latter made it clear that they will not return under the suzerainty of Somaliland. This position has become deeply engrained among many members of this clan during the months of bombardments and attacks by the Somaliland army. The government in Hargeysa, on the other hand, has to convince the hardliners among its own population, especially the younger generation, that grew up with a narrative of Somaliland that represents only parts of the people in the region, that the ‘politics as usual’ has come to an end. It also has to find a way  to prevent potentially irreparable damage to its so far good reputation as a de facto state in the Horn of Africa that over the past two decades flourished economically, especially in the central (Isaaq-inhabited) regions.

Overall, to settle this crisis over Lasanod, a new political arrangement is required that must involve negotiations between all stakeholders to the conflict: Somaliland, Dhulbahante, Puntland and the federal government in Mogadishu. The pending question is: can a solution be found that respects the achievements reached in central (and partly western) Somaliland up until the present, and simultaneously serves to build a stable, united Somalia, as is essentially the aim of those supporting the uprising in Lasanod, which also is the official position of most other Somalis and, officially, the members of the international community?

End Note

[1]There was a plan to enlarge the guddiga 33kato, a council of 45 members. The aim was to incorporate several important additional representatives of the local community. This change would not alter the tasks of the council.