The conclusions being drawn from these charts are misleading and reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of genocide.
Chart 1) The underlying list contains 21,637 children under 18 among 72,835 identified fatalities – almost 30%. Even if you exclude every boy aged 15-17 as a possible combatant, that leaves 18,316 children aged 14 or younger plus girls aged 15-17. That is a damning civilian toll and evidence of indiscriminate targeting.
Chart 2) This simply shows that adult men face a higher risk of being killed than their population share would suggest. It does not show why they were killed or establish that they were militants because age and sex are not combatant classifications.
Civilian men are typically more likely to be outside collecting food and supplies, working, rescuing others, or accompanying family members. They are also more likely to be treated as potential threats by an invading army. Similar data showing male overrepresentation can be observed in other insurgencies involving large civilian casualties.
Chart 3) This is visually misleading both through the truncated and inconsistent y-axes, and by treating population decline as though it measures deaths.
In Rwanda, for example, roughly 800,000 people were killed, but around two million also fled the country. This is clear from the dip and subsequent rapid population recovery in the chart. This reflects refugee returns and subsequent births, obviously not the murdered population coming back to life.
Gaza's borders have largely been closed, so its nearly 2 million displaced people remain counted within Gaza instead of appearing as a population decline. The attached counterfactual illustrates how significantly the chart could change if civilians had been able to leave, as in Rwanda.
Chart 4) This is just a nonsensical mess. It mixes disputed historical classifications, legally established genocides, and ordinary wars, and it uses inconsistent definitions of deaths and targeted populations.
It then takes all of these flawed inputs to imply a casualty threshold that does not exist in genocide law.
It conveniently omits Srebrenica, where genocide was legally established despite 'only' approximately 8,000 killings – a small proportion of the total population of Bosnia or former Yugoslavia. The Cambodian point is also misleading. The approximately 2 million deaths under the Khmer Rouge were not all judicially classified as genocide, as many were prosecuted as crimes against humanity.
Genocide is determined by prohibited acts committed with the specific intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in substantial part. The number and proportion killed can be evidence of that intent and intended destruction, but there is no minimum death toll or percentage threshold. And killing is only one of the five genocidal acts.





