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Analysis of the 2026 Iran war

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The 2026 Iran war has been analysed in terms of its possible military and political consequences for the Islamic Republic of Iran, United States, Israel and other belligerents, and from international legal and geopolitical standpoints.

In the early months of the war, some analysts argued that Iran's ability to preserve the Islamic Republic, strike American bases, and disrupt the Strait of Hormuz showed the limits of American military power.[1][2] Other analysts cautioned against treating the Islamic Republic's survival as a strategic victory. The US and Israel inflicted severe losses on Iran's conventional capabilities despite Iran's ability to impose costs on American allies.[3] Michael Froman, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, argued after the first ceasefire that it was "simply too soon to tell" whether the war had advanced American interests, citing both American military achievements and Iran's use of the Strait as leverage.[4]

Since hostilities resumed in July, analysts have considered the war outcome unresolved. In August, Reuters' columnist Ron Bousso described the conflict as a stalemate in which neither side had shown a convincing strategy for breaking the deadlock.[5]

Donald Trump's threats to destroy Iranian infrastructure have drawn warnings from international law experts that such actions could constitute war crimes under the Rome Statute,[6] and be actionable under universal jurisdiction.[7]

Objectives

Some analysts noted the lack of a clear objective when starting the conflict.[8]

Legality

Many experts argue that the war is illegal under US law because launching a war requires congressional authorization. The war is also considered to be in violation of the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force, because the attacks fail to meet the criteria for self-defense and lack authorization from the United Nations Security Council.[9] In response, the Trump administration claimed that previous presidents have also launched unauthorized military actions, and dismissed international law.[9][10] In international criminal law, experts have identified the attacks as a crime of aggression,[11][12] specifically as a war of aggression.[13][14] The US attack also violates the Algiers Accords (1981) in which the US agreed not to intervene politically or militarily in Iran's internal affairs. Numerous critics and analysts identified the US-Israeli attack with a more open embrace of expansionism[15][16] and imperialism by the Trump administration,[17][18] and a departure from the norms of the liberal international order.[19]

Algiers Accords

The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.

— Algiers Accords (1981), General Declaration, Point I, Paragraph 1.[20]

According to the Point I of the General Declaration of the Algiers Accords between Iran and the United States, the United States pledged that it would no longer intervene in Iranian internal affairs.[21] Iran has sued the US in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) in The Hague over the 2026 war, invoking the Algiers Accords.[22]

United States law

Many legal and military experts said that US actions in Iran are a type that require congressional authorization. They also noted the frequent use of the word "war" in Trump administration communication about the strikes, supporting the claim that the Trump administration had bypassed congressional war powers. Rubio said that the Trump administration had followed the War Powers Resolution, but questioned whether it was legally binding.[9] Multiple American presidents and administrations have launched wars or military operations without congressional approval.[23] Legal experts have argued that Trump's actions in Iran can be distinguished from prior non-authorized uses of force because the "speculative pre-emptive" justification for this war is comparatively weak when measured against past domestic and international legal rationales.[24]

US State Department Legal Adviser Reed D. Rubinstein argued that the US strikes on Iran were justified, as they were launched "in the collective self-defense of its Israeli ally, as well as in the exercise of the United States' own inherent right of self-defense," asserting that the military campaign was not a new war but rather a continuation of the ongoing conflict deriving from "Iran's malign aggression over decades" since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This included the Iranian attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, Iranian proxy warfare against the US and Israel, and Iran's nuclear program.[25] Qatar Tribune expressed that the justifications for war against Iran by American officials was reminiscent of 2003 where like the argument of supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) construction by Iraq, war proponents argued that Iran was also pursuing WMDs or similar weapons and that the United States needed to intervene militarily.[26]

On 13 March, the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated "... no quarter, no mercy for our enemies." Aside from being "especially prohibited" in international law to "declare that no quarter will be given," it is also prohibited in the US Department of Defense's own law of war manual. Hegseth's statement likely violates US War Crimes statute 18 U.S.C. § 2441.[10]

On 5 April, Trump repeatedly threatened to bomb all of Iran's bridges and power plants if it did not agree to a deal to end the war, setting a deadline of 8:00 p.m. EDT on 7 April. Trump wrote in a Truth Social post that "a whole civilization will die" if Iran refused to comply.[27] Lieutenant Colonel Rachel VanLandingham, a professor at Southwestern Law School, told PBS News that targeting electricity systems could affect access to clean water, many civilian facilities including hospitals, and terrify the population. VanLandingham said Trump's rhetoric could constitute a violation of US law, which prohibits "measures of intimidation against a civilian population", including efforts primarily intended to "sow terror amongst that civilian population".[28]

International law

Legality of US-Israeli attacks

The joint US–Israeli attacks on Iran are widely considered illegal under international law, as they violate the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force because they fail to meet the criteria for self-defense and were not authorized by the United Nations Security Council.[29][11][12] There is no recognized legal basis for preventive war or forcible regime change.[30] The attacks have been, therefore, considered a war of aggression.[19][31][13][14]

Ben Saul, UN special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, stated that Iran had not enriched uranium to the point of building a nuclear device, that experts agreed Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon, and that the case was nowhere close to being self-defense against an imminent attack.[29] Don Rothwell, a professor of international law at the Australian National University, stated that the Security Council did not pass a resolution to attack Iran and had no legal basis for justifying use of force.[29] The Law Society Journal noted that striking Iran during active negotiations was against the principles of good faith outlined in Article 2(2) of the UN Charter.[32]

US President Trump had threatened to destroy all the bridges and power plants in Iran and said the country will be brought "back to the Stone Ages, where they belong," if it did not agree to a deal to end the war or reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[33][34][35] According to legal scholar Tom Dannenbaum at Stanford Law School, Robert Goldman, a war crimes expert at the American University Washington College of Law, and Sarah Yager, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch, targeting Iranian infrastructure, including power plants, would violate international law if it causes harm to civilians that is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.[36] Although immediate prosecution of Trump administration officials for alleged war crimes is unlikely (similar to Benjamin Netanyahu over the Gaza war), such prosecutions in principle can be brought by any country exercising universal jurisdiction at any time in the future.[37] Luis Moreno Ocampo, the founding chief prosecutor of the ICC, argued that threats by Donald Trump to destroy Iranian infrastructure, alongside mutual attacks on energy infrastructure by Iran and Israel, do not constitute legitimate military targets under international humanitarian law and are war crimes under the Rome Statute. Ocampo likened these actions to the Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure that led to ICC indictments.[38] Stephen J. Rapp, former US ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, said that such conduct risks making the US a rogue state. He and two other international law experts interviewed by NBC News said that Trump's threats alone could potentially constitute a war crime.[35]

More than 100 international law experts signed an open letter in Just Security[10] expressing "profound concern" over "serious violations of international law", namely:[12]

  • violation of the UN Charter by attacking Iran[10]
  • violations of international humanitarian law by targeting political leaders with no military role, oil and gas infrastructure (including attack on South Pars), and water desalination plants (e.g. in Iran and Bahrain)[10]
  • rhetoric and threats from officials, including the threat of denial of quarter by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, dismissal of rules of engagement and international law by Trump and Hegseth, and threats on energy infrastructure by Trump administration.[10]
  • the US Defense Department's systematic weakening of the protections meant to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, including removing senior military lawyers and replacing military judge advocates general, undermining legal oversight of combat operations, as well as abolishing mechanisms designed to limit harm to civilians.[10]

Legality of Iranian response

According to The Guardian, under international law, Iran has the right to attack US and Israeli military targets following their attacks on Iran; however, Iranian attacks against civilians and against countries not party to the conflict are illegal.[11] The blocking of the strait of Hormuz by Iran was described by Majid Rafizadeh as a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[39] Neither Iran nor the United States is a party to the treaty. Iran signed but did not ratify the treaty, and asserts its right to regulate the passage of foreign ships through its territorial waters. The United States treats the UNCLOS as "reflective of customary international law" despite not being a signatory. Bertina Kudrin concluded that "International maritime law, despite its many rules, is not equipped for today’s globalized world and chokepoints," due to the tensions between existing regimes of maritime law and complex developments in maritime economics since their implementation.[40]

Hostilities in a chokepoint such as the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate tensions between the governing legal regimes: The transit passage legal regime assumes uninterrupted navigation through international straits, while the law of naval warfare permits interference with shipping during armed conflict. At the same time, the law of self-defense evaluates proportionality in relation to the adversary state, even though disrupting a chokepoint can impose economic costs on dozens of neutral countries that depend on the route.

— Bertina Kudrin, The Strait of Hormuz and the Limits of Maritime Law

The US naval blockade of Iran was described as legitimate under international law of naval warfare by Australian legal expert Donald Rothwell, though the UN specialized agency International Maritime Organization insisted that there is "no legal basis in international law" for such action.[41] Amnesty International declared Iran's recruiting of child soldiers a war crime.[42][43]

Effects on Iran

Iranian military strategy and effectiveness

The quicker Iranian response relative to that of the Twelve-Day War suggests a change in Iran's command structure.[44][45][46][47] H. A. Hellyer, a Middle East expert, notes that Iran has moved beyond its initial goal of mere survival. The regime has proven its resilience and has fundamentally altered the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz.[48]

According to senior adviser to the UAE president Dr. Anwar Gargash, Iran's strategy intended to undermine the willingness of the Gulf states to support the United States. Iran's targeting of Gulf states may also have been intended to increase energy prices globally, further putting global pressure on the US.[49]

Trita Parsi said on 19 August that Tehran believed it held the military advantage and had begun openly considering taking the offensive rather than just reacting to American attacks. By doing so, he argued, Iran would take control of the war’s scope, geography, and timing away from the US.[50]

Vali Nasr explains that Iran is aggressively escalating tensions to deny Donald Trump the ability to manage or downplay the conflict ahead of the midterm elections. By threatening to expand attacks on U.S. and Gulf targets while bolstering its leadership with hardline figures, Tehran aims to force the U.S. to immediately comply with the terms of the MOU.[51]

Operation Economic Outcast

"Economic D-Day," or "Operation Economic Outcast" is a U.S.-led campaign of sanctions and economic isolation launched against Iran in August 2026 amid the ongoing Iran war.[52] Various analysts expressed skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the sanctions and warned of significant global repercussions. Daniel Fried characterized the measures as neither an "economic death blow" nor a game changer,[53] while Andrew L. Peek argued that their impact would be limited by Iran’s ability to evade maritime oil restrictions and source funds through neighbors.[54] The announcement coincided with the Iranian rial hitting a record low, with the rial dropping to 2.05 million to the US dollar on the open market as trading began, compared with an official central bank rate of around 1.5 million rial to the dollar.[55] Days earlier, the United Arab Emirates had announced it was suspending all trade with Iran, one of Iran's largest trading partners and biggest sources of imports.[55]

Jonathan Panikoff further questioned their efficacy, citing the Gulf states' reluctance to isolate Iran, the difficulty of severing China's financial ties to Tehran, and regional doubts about U.S. policy consistency.[56][57][58]

Beyond effectiveness, Maia Nikoladze warned that escalating against Chinese financial institutions could trigger Chinese retaliation in critical minerals,[59] a sentiment echoed by Kenneth Rogoff, who noted that sanctions might accelerate dedollarization and prompt China to leverage its control over rare earths and pharmaceuticals.[60] Lesley Chavkin aligned with Rogoff, observing that such measures could drive trade toward non-dollar financial channels that remain inaccessible to the United States.[61]

Strait of Hormuz

The war unexpectedly showed Iran's most important tool is neither its missile program nor its nuclear program, but the ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, which quickly put pressure on US and its allies.[62] International Crisis Group's Iran Project director Ali Vaez stated, "In the attempt to try to prevent Iran from developing a weapon of mass destruction, the US handed Iran a weapon of mass disruption" in the form of weaponized control over the Strait of Hormuz.[63] According to Frank Gardner, Iran has effectively "broken out of its box".[64]

A map titled "Operation Epic Fury Timeline – First 100 Hours" used during press briefing at the Pentagon on 4 March 2026

Yemeni Leverage

According to Gregory Brew, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group, the Houthis' success in Yemen has shifted the balance of power back in Iran's favor. Iran has managed to alter the status quo without triggering a full-scale war, which its leadership likely wants to avoid for now.[65]

Internal Iranian politics

On 17 April 2026, Abdullah Mohtadi of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan viewed the Islamic Republic as having been "[in]sufficiently weakened" by the war for Iranian Kurdish groups to take action towards their goal of federalism in Iran, which, according to Mohtadi, they see as necessary for democratisation.[66]

Iranian civilians

Although the US President Trump started the war with a promise to help free the Iranians from the regime, nearly five months later, the US forces have started targeting the civilian infrastructure those same people depend on.[67]

Effects on the United States

American negotiating strategy and effectiveness

During the 2026 Iran war ceasefire, analyst Trita Parsi argued that Trump had become increasingly desperate for a deal with Iran to the point of even denying ceasefire violations by Iran to maintain it. Furthermore, he suggested that Trump was looking for a "silver bullet" instead of serious negotiations with Iranian leaders.[68] Allison Minor, director of the Project for Middle East Integration at the Atlantic Council, argues that to end the war, President Trump must learn to "lose well" by reframing victory rather than pursuing an impossible unconditional surrender from Iran. She tells DW that this shift requires the U.S. to accept painful short-term concessions to secure its long-term interests.[69] According to The Guardian's diplomatic editor, Patrick Wintour, Tehran has crafted a long-term negotiating strategy meant to trap Donald Trump in the Iran conflict through the midterms, hoping to replicate the 1979 hostage crisis and inflict the same ruinous blow on his presidency that destroyed Jimmy Carter's.[70] Ali Vaez, deputy program director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, warned that if the expired memorandum of understanding is not revived, the standoff between the United States and Iran could spiral into a "forever war", adding that Washington's economic pressure would only harden Tehran’s position.[71]

American geopolitical status

Several articles starting from April onward have argued that the 2026 Iran war has weakened the United States' reputation and geopolitical status, resulting in American decline. The Conversation listed several reasons for why the United States has been in a weakened position, namely loss of influence in the Middle East, limiting its geopolitical involvement in other regions, the massive economic crisis from the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis, and the rupture of the world order leading to loss of American global power.[72] In the opinions column of The New York Times, journalist Christopher Caldwell stated that the war had "turned into a watershed in the decline of the American empire" because of its overextension. He argued that while the so-called "Donroe Doctrine", practiced in execution by the 2026 United States intervention in Venezuela, the Greenland crisis, and the 2026 Cuban crisis, was a "logical, even an admirable, foreign policy plan", the Iran war was illogical because it was not "defensive" for foreign policy purposes and became another trap as another "Middle Eastern military misadventure".[73] The Nation wrote that this consensus was becoming more common outside of pro-Trump partisan circles of "knee-jerk loyalty".[74] The Salt Lake Tribune criticized Trump for his exaggerations of Iranian missiles and nuclear weapons being able to hit Americans and for initially predicting a quick victory where Iran would surrender and change their leadership. The article further lambasted him for his war drastically increasing gas prices and for contradicting demands including by repeatedly backing down in a "TACO" (Trump always chickens out) process.[75] Neoconservative scholar Robert Kagan in The Atlantic wrote that the United States had suffered a "total defeat" that was unprecedented in its history as a result of its war in Iran, arguing that there was no way for it to return to the status quo ante and no way to an "American triumph" for it. He suggested that Iran would have no interest in reopening the Strait of Hormuz and that Trump was too unreliable an actor given how he previously boasted of a surprise attack like the 1941 Attack on Pearl Harbor. As a result, he continued, the war helped accelerate the world into an increasingly post-American world order, where the United States' "once-dominant position in the Gulf" will have been the first to have been lost.[76]

The historian Alfred W. McCoy described the war as another "micro-military disaster" that accelerated the destruction of successive empires over the past 2,500 years.[77]

American military strategy and effectiveness

Analysts argued that deliberate reductions to US intelligence capacity in the period preceding the conflict had created structural limitations on American operational effectiveness, with the rescue of the downed F-15E crew exposing the extent to which institutional erosion was constraining strategic outcomes across multiple theatres.[78] The Atlantic noted the diplomatic strain between Trump and European NATO member nations, as Trump had previously not consulted them regarding the entrance to war against Iran and had since lashed out at them for not joining the war campaign against it.[79]

The Sunday Guardian referred to Trump as "coward-in-chief" for failing to use his massive military advantage to fully defeat the Islamic Republic, thus making it appear as if the US is losing against Iran despite the technical stalemate.[80] The New York Times opinion columnist Thomas L. Friedman wrote that the Iran war demonstrated that Trump had acted less as commander-in-chief and more as "commander-in-thief". He argued that by alienating Democrats and prioritizing an Anti-Weaponization Fund as part of Trump v. Internal Revenue Service to the point of condemnation by some Republicans, Trump had failed to unite his country to war against Iran. Furthermore, he continued, Trump had also alienated traditional allies of the US from the war by emphasizing expansionism against them, creating economic pressure against them, and not consulting NATO allies on the war beforehand.[81]

Former UK adviser Peter Ricketts argues that airstrikes cannot force Iran to yield to US demands. Tehran maintains significant leverage because it can endure military strikes and retaliate by closing the Strait of Hormuz, creating massive economic consequences for the United States.[48]

The Iran war offered China, Russia and North Korea a rare opportunity to learn about certain new American weapons and tactics in combat, as well as how quickly the U.S. depleted its long-range Tomahawk missiles and Patriot interceptors.[82]

Role of lobbies and think tanks

Foreign Policy argued that the Israel lobby in the United States held a lot of responsibility for the Iran war because of its influence in degrading relations between the United States and Iran to the point of full hostility and because it enabled Israeli aggression in the region under Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[83] The Forward pointed out that Israeli influence on the United States government and that of pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) had considerable influence on American foreign policy, especially leading to the Iran war of 2026.[84] Jacobin accused AIPAC of influencing US Congress representatives in voting against measures to block further US military action on Iran under Trump.[85] The Economist observed further American public backlash against pro-Israel lobbying like from AIPAC as a result of the 2026 war, previously accelerated by the Gaza war beginning in 2023.[86]

The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft blamed neoconservative and pro-Israel think tanks for promoting warfare against Iran months before the 2026 war began, suggesting that they held the same level of responsibility for pushing for the Iraq War that began in 2003.[87] Al Jazeera pointed out that the neoconservative think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which includes networks of former Israeli military and intelligence officials, held heavy influence over the Trump administration's hostility towards Iran, thus setting up confrontation towards the Iran war.[88]

Trump and Republican party

Vali Nasr argues that Iran is deliberately escalating tensions to prevent Donald Trump from controlling or minimizing the conflict before the midterm elections.[51] According to Iran analyst Farzan Sabet of the Geneva Graduate Institute, Iran is likely to escalate militarily—while avoiding full-scale war—in hopes of raising global oil prices or closing the Strait of Hormuz, betting that an unpopular conflict ahead of the U.S. midterm elections could harm President Trump and the Republican Party.[89] According to Mohamad Bazzi, director of New York University's Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, Trump began laying the groundwork for apocalyptic threats against Iran just weeks into the war, after it became clear that the United States would not achieve the swift military victory he had hoped for, while his repeated threats to "wipe out" Iran risk normalizing mass violence.[90]

Effects on other states

China

The war has been described as having various benefits and drawbacks for Chinese geopolitical interests. The BBC reported that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the war in Iran may weaken Chinese interests in countries that rely on Gulf countries' oil.[91] US aggression in Iran played into Chinese rhetoric that frames China as "a pillar of stability in contrast to an unpredictable America." Analysts noted that China has interests both in Iran and in the Gulf states, and that Gulf states may seek closer ties with China after facing attacks from Iran because of their US-alignment. However, analysts also pointed to the loss of discounted sanctioned oil and the inflationary impact of oil scarcity as potential economic drawbacks to the war.[92] Ashok Swain suggested that Trump's coercive diplomacy and expansionist actions against Iran would erode American power due to overstretching its resources in favor of China.[93]

The Diplomat argued that the United States, rather than China as US foreign policy analysts initially framed, became the revisionist power of the 2020s undermining international law and world peace, as evident by the former having started "an unprovoked war against Iran for reasons no one in the Trump administration seems to know" among many other imperialist and expansionist actions.[94]

Zhao Long, director of the Institute for Strategic and International Security Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, said after unveiling the "Operation Economic Outcast" against Iran that China is unlikely to accept Washington dictating its companies' trade with third countries or becoming a tool for the US's maximum pressure strategy.[95]

Israel

Based on the Israeli political landscape and enthusiasm for the war, Daniel Levy wrote on 30 March that its interests may be opposed to all who are seeking an end to the war. He said the Lebanon theatre of war was another campaign with no clear endgame. He concluded that "Israel will continue to encourage and provoke escalation and to undermine any negotiation or ceasefire talks, including nudging the US towards ground operations." He said Israel's actions accelerate US global decline.[96]

Russia

The Washington Institute said that the war had been a setback for Russian influence in the region. However, they also noted that it may distract the United States from the war in Ukraine.[97]

Geopolitical implications

American expansionism

Numerous critics and analysts identified the US-Israeli attack as a more open embrace of expansionism[15][16] and imperialism by the Trump administration.[17][18] Similarly, Israel's confrontation with Iran and occupation of Lebanese territory and resources has been considered to be territorial and influential expansionism, especially in relation to the "Greater Israel" ideology.[98][99][100] The US–Israeli attack is widely considered a "war of choice".[101] According to the founding chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Luis Moreno Ocampo, the US war on Iran is comparable to Russia's war in Ukraine, adding that the world is going from the "rules-based system" to the "rule of the man", which is "not a viable world".[19] A number of US and Israeli officials, including Hegseth,[102] have made religious justifications for the war.[103][104]

President Trump addresses the nation assuring that the military activity in the Middle East was "nearing completion", 1 April.

Gilbert Achcar said that the US was practicing a modernized version of gunboat diplomacy.[105] Gokay and Hamourtziadou connected the attack on Iran with a longstanding pattern of US interventions in the region. They also connected the attack on Iran in the midst of negotiations to the history of United States treaty-breaking during westward expansion.[106] Saeed Shah wrote that many in the Global South do not view the war as having the moral purpose that the US and many of its allies asserted, and that they instead see the war as a failure of diplomacy, and an act of aggression against a weaker nation. International relations experts said that the erosion of international law was making nations in the Global South feel insecure, and more likely to support a coalition against US interests.[107]

Nuclear proliferation

An analyst at Eagle Intelligence Reports argued that the strikes reinforced North Korea's nuclear deterrence calculus, with Pyongyang interpreting the military action against a non-nuclear Iran as strategic validation of its own weapons programme as essential to regime survival, and that the conflict would accelerate North Korean nuclear expansion while making denuclearisation talks "almost unimaginable in the foreseeable future".[108]

The war took place while non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was "already under significant strain." In February 2026, New START expired. Additionally, as "lessons of the Cold War and the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons fade from living memory", public support to possess nuclear weapons has reportedly risen in several countries.[109] The war along with the histories of other countries which have given up their ambitions for nuclear weapons or the weapons themselves such as Iraq, Libya and Ukraine may also incentivize nuclear proliferation.[110][111][112]

Comparisons to other conflicts

Suez crisis

Multiple sources compared the closure of the Strait to the Suez Crisis, suggesting that it would similarly result in a strategic failure for the US.[113][114][115]

Vietnam War

Foreign Policy considered the Iran war to be a major defeat for the US, one that was far bigger than that in the Vietnam War. The author wrote that while the Iran war looked like a typical US defeat in other conflicts, Trump's loss marked an unambiguously weaker US geopolitical position with its strategic objectives being weakened.[116] Howard W. French, the American journalist, also draws parallels between the Iran war and the Vietnam War, invoking the sage's warning: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."[117] Admiral James G. Stavridis noted that while Iran "doesn’t have a great hand of cards ... they're playing it pretty well," using a war of attrition strategy—similar to the North Vietnamese—to try and force the U.S. to walk away.[118]

Iran hostage crisis

The Conversation suggested that similar to the 1979 to 1981 Iran hostage crisis that humiliated the US and drastically weakened president Jimmy Carter's reelection chances for the 1980 United States presidential election, Iran may have been employing similar methods of stalling the war to weaken president Donald Trump ahead of the 2026 United States elections.[119] Middle East analyst Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argued that Trump was trapped in the conflict because his objectives regarding the Gulf region and the Strait of Hormuz were holding him hostage. He continued that just as Iran had once damaged Carter's reputation, Trump's was set on the same path.[120]

Iran–Iraq War

ThePrint compared the 2026 Iran war to the Iran–Iraq War, suggesting that both Donald Trump and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein lured themselves into believing that they achieve easy victories against Iran in warfare but found themselves stuck in quagmires as a result.[121]

Iraq War

Financial Times recalled the "you break it, you buy it" rule used previously during the Iraq War, where the US has caused the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis that threatened to overturn the global oil supply and hence "owned" that problem.[122] Contrasting the European responses to the Iran and Iraq wars, Serge Halimi and Pierre Rimbert wrote that "[European] governments that once vehemently opposed the war in Iraq now limit themselves to muted protest."[123]

Russo-Ukrainian War

The Guardian wrote that both Russian president Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump had gotten themselves trapped in their wars of choice because neither had been able to resolve their respective conflicts in their favors. They continued that both presidents had long built their "authoritarian strongmen" images but, as a result, surrounded themselves with sycophants who refused to push back against their respective leaders.[124]

See also

References

  1. ↑
    • Pirzadeh, Reza (2 April 2026). "War in Iran: Triple Failure and Strategic Deadlock". Institut Montaigne.
    • Editorial Board (15 June 2026). "President Trump Lost This War". The New York Times.
    • Tannehill, Brynn (23 June 2026). "America's Big Mistake in Iran". The Atlantic.
    • Este, Jonathan (7 May 2026). "Iran war has shown the limits of US power". The Conversation.
  2. ↑
  3. ↑ Byman, Daniel (2 April 2026). "Who Is Winning the Iran War?". Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  4. ↑ Froman, Michael (10 April 2026). "Was the Iran War Worth It?". Council on Foreign Relations.
  5. ↑ Bousso, Ron (26 August 2026). "US-Iran war sinks into energy trench warfare six months on". Reuters.
  6. ↑ Bateman, Tom (24 March 2026). "Iran war shows norms of international conflicts have been overturned". BBC News.
  7. ↑ "Trump Gloats on Possible War Crimes in Iran, But Punishment Distant". France 24. 2 April 2026.
  8. ↑ "The Trump Administration's Iran Plan Is Even Crazier Than We Thought". The New Republic. Retrieved 30 August 2026.
  9. 1 2 3 Bagchi, Aysha (5 March 2026). "'Might makes right'? Why experts have fears for rule of law". USA Today. Retrieved 17 March 2026.
  10. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dannenbaum, Tom; Hamilton, Rebecca; Haque, Adil Ahmad; Hathaway, Oona A.; Rona, Gabor (2 April 2026). "Over 100 International Law Experts Warn: U.S. Strikes on Iran Violate UN Charter and May Be War Crimes". Just Security. Reiss Center on Law and Security, New York University School of Law.
  11. 1 2 3 Siddique, Haroon (2 March 2026). "What is the legality of the US and Israeli attacks on Iran?". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 2 March 2026. Retrieved 10 March 2026.
  12. 1 2 3 Bateman, Tom; James, Imogen (3 April 2026). "Iran war: International law experts allege violations in Iran war". BBC.
  13. 1 2 "What You Need to Know about The U.S. War on Iran". American Friends Service Committee. 9 March 2026.
  14. 1 2 "UN Experts Denounce Aggression on Iran and Lebanon, Warn of Devastating Regional Escalation". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 12 March 2026.
  15. 1 2 Chaisse, Julien (9 March 2026). "What crises in Iran, Panama, Venezuela and Greenland have in common". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 27 March 2026.
  16. 1 2 Chellaney, Brahma (3 April 2026). "The MissOil Strike: The World Pays for One Man's Expansionist Follies". Open.
  17. 1 2 Tait, Robert (1 March 2026). "Trump's current war on Iran picks up where a longstanding enmity left off". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 16 March 2026.
  18. 1 2 Martin, Peter; Martin, Eric (1 March 2026). "Trump's Iran Strikes Usher in an Era of Unrestrained American Power". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 2 March 2026. 'Trump is clearly an imperialist president. He's clearly someone who is infatuated with his own power in terms of being able to deploy our military,' New Jersey Democratic Senator Andy Kim said
  19. 1 2 3 "Iran war shows norms of international conflicts have been upended". BBC News. 24 March 2026. Archived from the original on 24 March 2026.
  20. ↑ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (17 July 2026). "We Have Been There Before: The US-Iran MOU and the Algiers Accords". CounterPunch.org.
  21. ↑ "Could Iran Bring the U.S. to Arbitration Over Its Iran Strikes? A 1981 Agreement Says Yes". Aceris Law LLC. May 9, 2026.
  22. ↑ "Iran Sues U.S. in Hague Tribunal Despite 'Near-Zero' Chance of Success". iranwire.com.
  23. ↑ Barrow, Bill (5 March 2026). "Congress hasn't officially declared war since WWII. Here's how presidential war powers have played out since then". PBS News Hour. Associated Press. Retrieved 18 March 2026.
  24. ↑ Mohamed 'Arafa (6 March 2026). "No Authorization, No Imminence, No Plan: The Iran Strikes and the Rule of Law". Jurist. Retrieved 24 March 2026.
  25. ↑ Lewis, Simon; Zengerle, Patricia (24 April 2026). "US legal adviser says Iran war justified by Tehran's 'aggression' over decades". Reuters. Retrieved 24 April 2026.
  26. ↑ Kluth, Andreas (3 March 2026). "The Iran strikes feel like 2003 all over again". Qatar Tribune. Retrieved 3 March 2026.
  27. ↑ "Trump says 'a whole civilization will die' as Iran freezes talks". The Washington Post. 7 April 2026. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 7 April 2026.
  28. ↑ Nawaz, Anna; Sagalyn, Dan (6 April 2026). "What international law says about Trump's threats to bomb Iran's bridges and power plants". PBS News Hour. Retrieved 7 April 2026.
  29. 1 2 3 Yosufzai, Rashida (1 March 2026). "Were the Israeli-US strikes on Iran legal under international law? These experts say no". SBS News. Retrieved 9 March 2026.
  30. ↑ Cáceres, Juan Zahir Naranjo; Brincat, Shannon (1 March 2026). "Neither preemptive nor legal, US-Israeli strikes on Iran have blown up international law". The Conversation. Retrieved 10 March 2026.
  31. ↑ "Red Flag Alert: Israel-U.S. War of Aggression against Iran". Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention and Human Security. 12 March 2026.
  32. ↑ "Neither preemptive nor legal, US‑Israeli strikes on Iran have blown up international law". Law Society Journal. 2 March 2026. Retrieved 9 March 2026.
  33. ↑ "Trump Revels in Threats to Commit War Crimes in Iran". The New York Times. 5 April 2026. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 5 April 2026.
  34. ↑ McGraw, Meridith (5 April 2026). "Trump Warns Iran He Could Strike 'Every Power Plant,' in WSJ Interview". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 5 April 2026.
  35. 1 2 "Trump's Iran threats alarm war crimes experts". NBC News. 1 April 2026. Retrieved 5 April 2026.
  36. ↑ Beaumont, Peter (3 April 2026). "Is the US committing war crimes by targeting Iran's civilian infrastructure?". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 5 April 2026.
  37. ↑ "Trump gloats on possible war crimes in Iran, but punishment distant". France 24. 2 April 2026.
  38. ↑ Bateman, Tom (24 March 2026). "Iran war shows norms of international conflicts have been overturned". BBC News.
  39. ↑ "Iran's blatant violations of international maritime laws". Arab News. 25 July 2019. Retrieved 18 March 2026.
  40. ↑ Kudrin, Bertina (2026-03-23). "The Strait of Hormuz and the Limits of Maritime Law". Lawfare.
  41. ↑ "Why and how is US blockading Iranian ports in Strait of Hormuz?". BBC News. 2026-04-12. Retrieved 2026-04-29.
  42. ↑ "Iran: Recruitment of child soldiers as young as 12 amounts to a war crime". Amnesty International. 2 April 2026. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  43. ↑ "Iran child recruitment amounts to war crime, Amnesty says". Iran International. 3 April 2026. Retrieved 3 April 2026.
  44. ↑ "The 'Fourth Successor': Iran's plan for a long war with the US and Israel". Al Jazeera English. Retrieved 14 March 2026.
  45. ↑ "How Iran'ps fightback surprised the US". The Financial Times. 13 February 2026. Retrieved 14 March 2026.
  46. ↑ "جنگ آمریکا و اسرائیل با ایران؛ چرا واکنش تهران این‌بار تنها چند ساعت طول کشید؟" [The war between the U.S. and Israel with Iran; why did Tehran's response this time only last a few hours?]. BBC News Persian (in Persian). 28 February 2026. Retrieved 1 March 2026.
  47. ↑ Rodgers, Joseph; Schiff, Bailey (28 February 2026). "Operation Epic Fury and the Remnants of Iran's Nuclear Program". CSIS. Retrieved 26 March 2026.
  48. 1 2 Sabbagh, Dan. "Trump pausing Iran attacks shows US military power is not enough on its own". The Guardian.
  49. ↑ Powell, Matthew (19 March 2026). "Why Iran is attacking Gulf energy infrastructure". The Conversation.
  50. ↑ Lister, Tim (19 August 2026). "Iran's latest warning to the US signals the hardliners are just getting started". CNN.
  51. 1 2 Tait, Robert (22 August 2026). "Persuasion, denial and bluster: Trump 'stuck' on Iran war ahead of elections". Guardian.
  52. ↑ "Declaring 'economic D-Day,' Trump says any country trading with Iran will be sanctioned". The Times of Israel. 2026-08-19. Retrieved 2026-08-24.
  53. ↑ "Experts react: Will Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast isolate Iran?". Atlantic Council: "The new Iran sanctions that Bessent rolled out Monday afternoon were, in Bessent’s own words, 'a warning shot,' not an economic death blow. ... But none of the moves was a game changer."
  54. ↑ "Experts react: Will Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast isolate Iran?". Atlantic Council: "The task now is implementation. It is a challenging diplomatic assignment. ... The effects will be limited, since Iran is not exporting oil by ship, but Tehran will try to scrounge enough dollars from its neighbors to survive and outlast this effort."
  55. 1 2 "WATCH: Bessent announces new sanctions to block Iran's revenue streams". PBS News. 2026-08-24. Retrieved 2026-08-24.
  56. ↑ "Experts react: Will Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast isolate Iran?". Atlantic Council: "The critical challenge is that, unlike a decade ago, the Gulf states are no longer leading the charge to isolate Iran."
  57. ↑ "Experts react: Will Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast isolate Iran?". Atlantic Council: " ... and getting US adversaries on board will be even harder. It is hard to envision this policy succeeding without China coming meaningfully on board, ..."
  58. ↑ "Experts react: Will Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast isolate Iran?". Atlantic Council: "The challenge for the administration is compounded by doubts in the region about whether Trump will be consistent about this policy."
  59. ↑ "Experts react: Will Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast isolate Iran?". Atlantic Council: "However, with the one-year US-China truce that paused US tariffs on China and Chinese bans on critical minerals set to expire this fall, any perceived economic escalation by the United States could prompt Chinese countermeasures, particularly in critical minerals."
  60. ↑ Kim, Sung-mo (2026-08-27). "Harvard Economist Warns U.S. Sanctions Accelerate De-Dollarization". The Chosun Daily. Retrieved 2026-08-27.
  61. ↑ "Experts react: Will Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast isolate Iran?". Atlantic Council: "[The enforcement of the sanctions] could also inadvertently push more trade into non-dollar financial channels, beyond the reach of the United States."
  62. ↑ Gol, Giar (8 April 2026). "«tangeh nparmaz», salahi bazdarandeh tar az bamb npastehyi" «تنگه هرمز»، سلاحی بازدارنده تر از بمب هسته‌ای [The Strait of Hormuz, a more deterrent weapon than a nuclear bomb] (in Persian). BBC News فارسی. Retrieved 11 April 2026.
  63. ↑ Landay, Jonathan; Banco, Erin; Stewart, Phil (3 April 2026). "US intelligence warns Iran unlikely to ease Hormuz Strait chokehold soon, sources say". Reuters. Retrieved 4 April 2026.
  64. ↑ Gardner, Frank (9 April 2026). "Trump tells Iran to negotiate as Vance heads to Pakistan for peace talks". BBC News. Retrieved 11 April 2026.
  65. ↑ Torbati, Yeganeh (12 September 2026). "Iran Finds Escalation Is Fruitful Path to Leverage in War With U.S." New York Times.
  66. ↑ "Iranian Kurdish opposition leader says federalism key to Iran's future". Rudaw Media Network. 16 April 2026. Wikidata Q139408979. Archived from the original on 18 April 2026.
  67. ↑ https://www.ms.now/news/iran-war-civilian-infrastructure-strikes
  68. ↑ "Trita Parsi on Iran War: Trump Still "Looking for a Silver Bullet" Instead of Negotiating Seriously". Democracy Now!. 4 May 2026. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
  69. ↑ "Can Trump end the Iran war and sell it as a victory?". DW. 4 August 2026.
  70. ↑ Wintour, Patrick (7 August 2026). "Iran plots to deal Trump a blow in midterms by keeping him entangled in war". The Guardian.
  71. ↑ "US and Iran in "game of chicken" as they miss deadline to reach deal, says analyst". CNN. 17 August 2026.
  72. ↑ Taliaferro, Jeffrey (11 April 2026). "4 ways the war in Iran has weakened the United States in the great power game". The Conversation. Retrieved 10 May 2026.
  73. ↑ Caldwell, Christopher (3 May 2026). "America Is Officially an Empire in Decline". The New York Times. Retrieved 10 May 2026.
  74. ↑ Heer, Jeet (4 May 2026). "Trump's Smartest Supporters Know the Iran War Is a Disaster". The Nation. Retrieved 10 May 2026.
  75. ↑ Hult, Raymond A. (27 April 2026). "Letter: In a nutshell, we're in a futile war orchestrated by a foolish and incompetent commander in chief". Salt Lake Tribune. Retrieved 11 May 2026.
  76. ↑ Kagan, Robert (10 May 2026). "Checkmate in Iran". The Atlantic. Retrieved 11 May 2026.
  77. ↑ McCoy, Alfred W. (28 May 2026). "American "Micro-Militarism," or How Defeat in the Iran War Will Accelerate American Global Decline". Fair Observer.
  78. ↑ Matisek, Jahara (April 14, 2026). "Intelligence Erosion and American Power Limits". Eagle Intelligence Reports. Eagle Intel S.R.L. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
  79. ↑ Stanley-Becker, Isaac (4 May 2026). "Europe Without America". The Atlantic. Retrieved 11 May 2026.
  80. ↑ Nalapat, M. D. (17 May 2026). "Coward-in-Chief President Trump". The Sunday Guardian. Retrieved 15 June 2026.
  81. ↑ Friedman, Thomas L. (2 June 2026). "Trump Has Failed as Commander in Chief". The New York Times. Retrieved 15 June 2026.
  82. ↑ Shearer, David (25 November 2020). "Assessing Capabilities and Limitations". Private Armies and Military Intervention. Routledge. pp. 65–72.
  83. ↑ Walt, Stephen M. (17 March 2026). "The Israel Lobby's Responsibility for the Iran War". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 13 August 2026.
  84. ↑ Michaelson, Jay (24 June 2026). "How Israel's strongest partisans destroyed global support for Israel". The Forward. Retrieved 13 August 2026.
  85. ↑ Schwenk, Katya (3 March 2026). "AIPAC Is Influencing Trump's War in Iran". Jacobin. Retrieved 13 August 2026.
  86. ↑ "America's pro-Israel lobby is facing a backlash". The Economist. 26 March 2026. Retrieved 13 August 2026.
  87. ↑ Lobe, Jim (14 April 2026). "Think the Iran war is a disaster? Blame these DC think tanks first". Responsible Statecraft. Retrieved 13 August 2026.
  88. ↑ Magee, Caolán (6 May 2026). "What is the FDD, the pro-Israel think tank shaping Trump's Iran policy?". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 13 August 2026.
  89. ↑ "Iran Signals Readiness to Escalate Fight in Face of Rising U.S. Pressure". New York Times. 9 September 2026.
  90. ↑ Bazzi, Mohamad (10 September 2026). "Trump's repeated threats to 'wipe out' Iran are normalizing mass violence". The Guardian.
  91. ↑ "Iran conflict and China: How it is unsettling Beijing and its ambitions". BBC News. 5 March 2026. Retrieved 18 March 2026.
  92. ↑ Leahy, Joe; White, Edward; Lewis, Leo; Tudor, Daniel (24 March 2026). "China's leaders hunt for strategic gains from US quagmire in Iran". Financial Times.
  93. ↑ Swain, Ashok (5 April 2026). "How the US will pay for Trump's expansionism". National Herald. Retrieved 6 April 2026.
  94. ↑ Hanssen, Ulv (12 March 2026). "The American Narrative About a Revisionist China Is Upside-Down". The Diplomat. Retrieved 10 May 2026.
  95. ↑ McCarthy, Simone (25 August 2026). "Trump will need China for his new economic war against Iran. Good luck getting Xi on side". CNN.
  96. ↑ Levy, Daniel (30 March 2026). "Did Israel miscalculate in launching the war on Iran?". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 30 March 2026.
  97. ↑ "Great Power Spillover from the Iran War: Implications for China, Russia, Turkey, and Europe". The Washington Institute. Retrieved 18 March 2026.
  98. ↑ Maziad, Marwa (20 April 2026). "How the Iran War Is Eroding the Gulf States' World". The National Interest. Retrieved 24 April 2026.
  99. ↑ Safieddine, Karim (28 March 2026). "Displacement and dissent: Hezbollah's war with Israel splits Lebanon's Shiites". Al-Monitor. Retrieved 24 April 2026.
  100. ↑ Safieddine, Hicham (9 March 2026). "How Iran war will shape the future of Hezbollah and Israeli expansionism". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 25 April 2026.
  101. ↑ "Mission accomplished? The 2003 boast that haunts today's Iran conflict". BBC News. 13 March 2026. Retrieved 16 March 2026.
  102. ↑ Jaffe, Greg; Dias, Elizabeth (20 March 2026). "Hegseth Invokes Divine Purpose to Justify Military Might". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 20 March 2026.
  103. ↑ Shamim, Sarah. "Why are the US and Israel framing the ongoing conflict as a religious war?". Al Jazeera English. Retrieved 20 March 2026.
  104. ↑ Ramirez, Marc (5 March 2026). "Faith and the Middle East: How religion could fuel a wider war". USA Today. Retrieved 20 March 2026.
  105. ↑ Abu-Manneh, Bashir; Achcar, Gilbert (9 March 2026). "Middle East Wars Are Still About Oil and Empire". Jacobin. Retrieved 10 March 2026. One could say that the United States has shifted under Trump, in his second term, to a modernized version of the nineteenth-century 'gunboat diplomacy', when major powers forced their will over weaker states by threatening to bomb them, or by actually bombing them if recalcitrant. There was then no concern about the nature of governments—only the naked will to crudely impose imperialist interests on weaker countries.
  106. ↑ Hamourtziadou, Lily; Gokay, Bulent (9 March 2026). "The Geopolitical Implications of the Iran War". E-International Relations. Retrieved 10 March 2026. The current US diplomacy with Iran can be characterised as an extension of an imperial modus operandi, reflecting a pattern in which agreements serve as leverage points, contingent upon full compliance and discarded when paramount interests necessitate escalation. Critics contend that the approach adopted by the Trump administration, integrating military operations with a binary choice between capitulation and conflict, exemplifies historical imperial patterns of dominance.
  107. ↑ Shah, Saeed (3 March 2026). "'Imperialist undertones': global south condemns US-Israeli war with Iran". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 10 March 2026. Siphamandla Zondi, professor of politics at the University of Johannesburg, said that in the west, wars were viewed as having moral purpose, while in the global south, conflict was seen as evil and a failure to behave as adults. He said that the US and Israel had cajoled some countries through the Abraham Accords for diplomatic recognition of Israel, and used force against others. 'This is a war of domination and subordination, therefore it has imperialist undertones and motives,' said Zondi. 'It makes the world unsafe for all of us.'
  108. ↑ Choi, Seong Hyeon (April 14, 2026). "Iran Operation Raises Stakes For North Korea". Eagle Intelligence Reports. Eagle Intel S.R.L. Retrieved April 15, 2026.
  109. ↑ Cole, Georgia (3 May 2024). "The Iran war risks triggering a new wave of nuclear proliferation". Chatham House. Archived from the original on 7 April 2026. Public opinion in several non-nuclear states such as Turkey, Poland and South Korea seems to be shifting towards support for developing domestic nuclear capabilities, as the lessons of the Cold War and the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons fade from living memory.
  110. ↑ Keating, Joshua (9 March 2026). "The dangerous lesson countries may take from the Iran war". Vox.com. Archived from the original on 9 March 2026. North Korea developed its program quickly, weathering years of crippling sanctions. In previous rounds of negotiations, North Korean officials have pointed to the fates of Libya and Iraq, two governments that gave up attempts to build a nuclear weapon and were later overthrown in US-led military operations.

    As Carnegie Endowment nuclear analyst Ankit Panda wrote this week, "Whatever the costs of this approach—and they were substantial!—nobody is bombing North Korea today. … Pyongyang and Tehran will present two parables for the next proliferator; it seems pretty clear which approach has more appeal."
  111. ↑ Campbell, Charlie (28 March 2026). "How War With Iran Could Lead to More Nuclear Weapons Around the World". Time (magazine). Of course, for rogue states the writing was already on the wall given the fates of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and Iraq's Saddam Hussein, both toppled after abandoning their nuclear programs. (Ukraine no doubt also rues voluntarily giving up its nukes following the breakup of the Soviet Union.) That message was underscored by Trump pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, officially the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018, spotlighting the futility of striking a bargain with a capricious U.S. where any administration can rip up the pacts of its predecessor.
  112. ↑ Tisdall, Simon (26 April 2026). "Iran didn't have a nuclear weapon before this war. But you can see why it would develop one now". The Guardian. Iran has joined a growing number of non-nuclear armed countries that have suffered grievously at the hands of domineering nuclear powers. In 1994, Ukraine surrendered its nukes in return for what turned out, when Russia first attacked it in 2014, to be valueless western security assurances. Iraq's regime, lacking a nuclear deterrent, succumbed to US invasion in 2003. Would Trump have attacked Venezuela in January had it been nuclear-armed?

    If the acknowledged nuclear weapons states honoured their 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) obligation to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nukes, others might feel less need of a nuclear shield. But they persistently break their word. Increasingly, the US and Russia abuse their dominant position – abuses that the NPT was specifically designed to prevent. Israel (unlike Iran) never signed the treaty.
  113. ↑ McCoy, Alfred W. (21 March 2026). "How the Iran War Gave Trump His Very Own Suez Crisis". Inkstick. Retrieved 11 April 2026.
  114. ↑ James, Harold (30 March 2026). "Donald Trump's Suez moment". The Japan Times. Retrieved 11 April 2026.
  115. ↑ Tharoor, Ishaan (30 March 2026). "Trump, Iran, and the Shadow of Suez". The New Yorker. ISSN 0028-792X. Retrieved 11 April 2026.
  116. ↑ Musgrave, Paul (16 June 2026). "Iran Is a Bigger Defeat Than Vietnam". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 29 June 2026.
  117. ↑ French, Howard W. (14 August 2026). "Yes, the Iran War Really Is Similar to Vietnam". Foreign Policy.
  118. ↑ Collinson, Stephen (20 July 2026). "New US escalation in Iran makes Trump's endgame vacuum more urgent". CNN.
  119. ↑ Saikal, Amin (9 June 2026). "Iran dragged out the 1979 hostage crisis to humiliate the US. It may try to do the same to Trump now". The Conversation. Retrieved 29 July 2026.
  120. ↑ Baker, Peter (14 July 2026). "In Iran, Trump Has Found an Opponent He Cannot Easily Dominate". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 July 2026.
  121. ↑ Swami, Praveen (24 April 2026). "Ceasefire won't end Iran War. US just set the stage for a new phase of endless conflict". ThePrint. Retrieved 11 August 2026.
  122. ↑ Wolf, Martin (18 March 2026). "Trump has broken it. Now he owns it". Financial Times. Retrieved 10 May 2026.
  123. ↑ Rimbert, Serge Halimi & Pierre (2026-04-01). "Iran war: Europe plays the ever-faithful lapdog". Le Monde diplomatique. Retrieved 2026-07-10.
  124. ↑ Behr, Rafael (10 June 2026). "Putin and Trump are both trapped in losing battles against reality". The Guardian. Retrieved 29 July 2026.
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