Computers Are Bad is a newsletter on the history of the computer
and communications industry. It will be thrown directly at your doorstep on
semi-regular schedule, to enlighten you as to why computers are that
way.
I have an MS in information security, several certifications, and ready
access to a keyboard. These are all properties which make me ostensibly
qualified to comment on issues of computer technology. I do my best to stay
away from my areas of professional qualification, though. Instead, I talk
about things that are actually interesting. Think mid-century
telecommunications history, legacies of the Cold War, and the rise and fall
of the technology industry's stranger bit players.
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Through decades of consolidation, reorganization, and divestiture, AT&T left
a famously complicated corporate history. One of the greatest enterprises in
American history, arguably the greatest enterprise, AT&T has often
rivaled the federal government in the size of its budget and workforce. One of
the reasons, as we well know today, was monopolization and its close relative
vertical integration. AT&T was the telephone system, or at least aspired to
be, and for decades the meaning of "Universal Service" was that the service was
designed, built, and operated by AT&T—universally.
While AT&T's tangled origins are fertile ground for the historian, they also
obscure many of the early stories of telephone history. Much of the work of the
early independent telephone industry has been lost in the voluminous
achievements of AT&T. Even very basic facts become obscure. For example, who
invented the telephone? Well, we all know the answer: Alexander Graham Bell. We
have mostly forgotten that, at the time, this was a hotly contested question.
One of the most prominent alternate claimants to the title was a man named
Elisha Gray, today immortalized as the "Gray" in electrical distributor
"Graybar," but better known in his time as an inventor of telegraph and
telephone equipment. Gray contracted prototyping of some of his inventions to an
upstart manufacturer and de facto Western Union spinoff, founded by Enos M.
Barton (the "bar" in Graybar) and George Shawk. Impressed by Barton's operation,
and at odds with Shawk on its future direction, Gray put together the money to
buy out Shawk and became half-owner of the company that would reincorporate, in
1872, as Western Electric (WE).
It is ironic, of course, that a man who might fairly be called one of the top
enemies of Bell helped to found the company that would become one of the most
important parts of the Bell System. It's not a coincidence: Gray's involvement
in WE included plans to manufacture his own telephone design, for
which he had filed a provisional patent. Like many of the late 20th century's
telephone inventors, Gray's greatest challenge in commercializing his invention
was not technical but legal. His provisional patent on a telephone transmitter,
substantially similar to the one invented by Bell and possibly older, led
Western Union to take take part ownership in WE to advance their
own plan to compete with AT&T as a telephone company. That set off a protracted
legal battle, whose end result included the termination of Gray's patent claim
and Western Union's abandonment of telephony.
It has been an unfortunate turn in the software industry, one of many as of
late, that gambling is once again one of its primary engines. With the rise of
almost nationwide online sports betting, not to mention prediction markets,
making odds on real-world events and extracting the money of suckers is no
longer limited to island nations. It is a great American pursuit, or at
least, that's what modern television sports coverage leads you to believe.
There has always been an uncomfortable relationship between software and the
manipulation of marks. Techniques developed by casinos became a fundamental part
of consumer software, while the software industry wholeheartedly embraced
"gaming" as a market (the older meaning of the term here, meaning gambling).
We can readily point to a couple of reasons: first, gambling is profitable, and
technology is first and foremost a means of accumulation. Second, gambling is
mathematical, or at least arithmetical, in nature. Most forms of gambling
involve some sort of complex calculation with real-world stakes.
Gambling predates history, or it might be better to say that gambling has been
around for as long as recorded history has been able to observe it. Most early
gambling seems to have been based on card or dice games, but humans have been
betting on animal fights for more than a thousand years. As sensibilities and
resources changed, animal fighting has mostly given way to animal competition.
The most famous of these wagering opportunities is horse racing, a form of
gambling with such a long and pervasive history that it has often achieved a
unique regulatory status as one of the only legal sports betting venues in the
US. Well, at least, before Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.
The earliest recorded horse races were held in England in 1539, and bets were
placed. By 1666, horse racing had reached such prominence that King Charles
II—himself a jockey—commissioned and then won the "Newmarket Town Plate." That
event's eccentric history gave way to the King's Plate, a broader 17th-century
racing series whose royal remit made up the first formal rules for the sport.
Queen Anne founded the racetrack at Ascot in 1711; while it took decades for
permanent facilities to be built at the track, only stands for the royal family
came before a betting office. As British empire expanded around the world, horse
racing spread with it. Likewise, horse racing spread throughout Europe. By the
19th century, horse racing could be found almost anywhere.
The submarine is a surprisingly ancient technology—at least in its early,
primitive forms. The idea is quite simple, that a well-enough-sealed boat ought
to be able to submerge and resurface. It's the practicalities that make the
whole thing difficult. It is generally considered that the US Civil War was the
first use of submarines in combat; these were primitive machines with very
limited operating endurance and navigational capabilities. These submarines
were more like torpedoes: you pointed them in the right direction and hoped
they went straight.
The First World War benefited from tremendous advances in submarine technology.
A number of experimental designs during the 19th century had built practical
experience, especially in Germany, and the Germans apt use of the first modern
"U-boats" had a significant military impact. British and US designs made similar
advances, and submarine warfare was born.
The chief advantage of the submarine is its ability to submerge and maneuver
while hidden. WW1 submarines were diesel-electric or gasoline, so their
submerged endurance was limited by the power supply stored onboard. Still,
these submarines could operate underwater longer than any before, long enough to
establish the submarine sneak attack as a key part of naval warfare.
It was also long enough to expose one of the trickiest challenges of underwater
defense: communications. Water, especially seawater, is dense and conductive.
This is very bad for radio wave propagation: by the first world war it had
already been discovered that seawater effectively blocked radio communications.
HF radio, the main form of communications at sea (and, in the WW1 era, in
general) might only penetrate seawater for a few meters in real-world
That meant that submarines had to surface in order to communicate, another de
facto limitation on their endurance while submerged.
The Navy had been evaluating electronic communication aboard ships since 1887,
when they demonstrated a simple and "radio-adjacent" technology using conduction
of waves through the seawater itself. This scheme never worked very well, but
was saved by the development of modern wireless transmitters late in that century. Marconi
himself demonstrated radio to the Navy in 1899, and in 1903 the Navy bought
its first radio sets. Tactical reports from conflicts elsewhere on the globe,
like the Russo-Japanese war, reinforced the idea that radio would serve a key
role in naval combat.
If you've done much with modern cellphones, you've probably noticed just how odd
the architecture can be around audio. Specifically, I mean call audio: modern
smartphones have made call audio less of a special case (mostly by just becoming
more complicated in general), but in older phones you would often find
arrangements where the cellular modem 1 had direct analog audio to the
microphone and speaker, perhaps via some switching to share amplifiers. That
design meant that the cellular modem functioned basically as a completely
independent device, a fully-capable "cellular phone" with the ability to
make and receive voice calls. The role of the rest of the smartphone, and its
operating system, was just to provide control messages for starting and ending
calls.
In modern phones the audio path to and from the modem is digital and it's more
integrated into the operating system audio service, but still not fully. You
might have noticed, for example, that it is excessively difficult to record
call audio on most phones. Regulatory and liability pressures are one reason for
this, but another is that it's actually kind of difficult: there may not be any
physical way for software running on the main processor to receive audio from
the cellular modem. The designer has to put in explicit effort to make that
work, effort that only became common more recently to facilitate automatic
transcription—and VoLTE, a whole complication that I will simply ignore for the
sake of a cleaner historical narrative. You come here to read about old phones,
not new ones.
You've probably read enough of my writing to know where this is going: the
design of cellular radios, which assume call audio to be part of Their Exclusive
Domain, is a legacy of an age-old architectural decision traceable to the
original Hayes Smartmodem. It relates to a feature of modems that was widely
available, but sparsely used, for much of the PC revolution. The details are
odd!
Light: it's the radiation we can see. The communications potential of light is
obvious, and indeed, many of the earliest forms of long-distance communication
relied on it: signal fires, semaphore, heliographs. You could say that we still
make extensive use of light for communications today, in the form of fiber
optics. Early on, some fiber users (such as AT&T) even preferred the term
"lightguide," a nice analogy to the long-distance waveguides that Bell
Laboratories had experimented with.
The comparison between lightguide and waveguide illuminates (heh) an important
dichotomy in radiation-based communication. We make wide use of radio frequency
in both free-space applications ("radio" as we think of it) and confined
applications (like cable television). We also make wide use of light in confined
fiber optic systems. That leaves us to wonder about the less-considered fourth
option: free-space optical (FSO) communications, the use of modulated light
without a confined guide.
Well, if I had written this two or three years ago, free-space optical might
have counted as quite obscure. The idea of using a modulated laser or LED light
source for communications over a distance is actually quite old. Commercial
products for Ethernet-over-laser have been available since the late 1990s and
achieved multi-gigabit speeds by 2010. Motivated mostly by Strategic Defense
Initiative and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization requirements for hardened
communications within satellite constellations, experiments on a gigabit laser
satellite-to-ground link were underway in 1998, although the system ultimately
only provided satisfactory performance at a rate of around 300 Mbps. As it
turns out, FSO computer networking is nearly as old as computer networking
itself, with a 1973 experimental system briefly put into use at Xerox PARC.
Despite the fact that FSO systems have been generally available and even quite
functional for decades, they remained a niche technology with very little public
profile until the phenomenon of low-orbit communications constellations (namely
Starlink) put the concept of intra-satellite laser communication into the
spotlight. Despite various experimental satellite-to-satellite systems dating
back to the early 2000s, and more or less clandestine military applications
over the same period, the first real production system is probably the EU's
EDRS, which went live in 2016. Starlink didn't really get the laser technology
working until 2022. That's one of the interesting things about FSO: it seems
intuitively like it should work, it does work, but it's a technology that has
often sat dormant for many years at a time.